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The predominate cyber discourse has focused on the impact of information theft 
as it relates to personal banking and financial data with occasional journalistic 
exploration of cyber enabled industrial and defense related intellectual property theft 
informing economic and national defense circles.  To date, little work has been published 
which explores the economic and international relations implications of cyberspace, and 
the associated exploitation of it, as it relates to obtaining advantage, military or economic, 
in the production of high-technology and defense related goods.  Even more 
simplistically little research has been done which examines cyberspace as a warfare 
domain for national security with a critical eye.   
Cyberspace allows for the storage of vast amounts of data virtually, the global 
transmission of this same data quickly and efficiently, and theft of this data easily if ill 
protected.  The complete economic impact of this lost intellectual property to 
technological superiority and national defense is not yet fully understood, although the 
simple monetary assessments of its loss are beginning to be discussed.   
This thesis aims to add to this understanding by examining the evolution of cyber 
power exploring it as a domain for U.S. war, current impediments to the recruitment of 
U.S. cyber professionals also known in defense circles as cyber warriors, and the use of 
cyberspace by the People’s Republic of China as a means of enabling intellectual 
property theft.  These focus areas were researched as a means to develop the idea of 
cyberspace warfare.  The inquisitive logic stream aimed to answer three questions: 
 
 iii 
(1) Is cyberspace an operational domain for U.S. warfare? (2) How does the U.S. recruit 
its warriors who fight and defend in cyberspace? (3) Who is an enemy or target of cyber 
war?  
The body of this work concluded that cyberspace is not currently an operational 
domain of warfare, as it has been traditionally defined, but is a developing area that 
seems to be domain-like.  The term domain-like was chosen to describe the current state 
of cyberspace as it relates to U.S. warfare due to the preponderance of cyber associated 
and attributed activity being leveraged as enabling functions to influence and shape 
actions and the environment prior conflict.   
The influence fight in the context of cyber can be defined as the capability to 
leverage cyberspace as an enabler for traditional efforts within the physical domains of 
land, sea, air and space.  For examples cyberspace is leveraged to obtain intellectual 
property, a feat that traditionally would have been done by acquiring a business sector 
through purchase or acquiring said intellectual property through espionage.  Further 
research will be needed to examine the implications of growing cyber capability if its use 
becomes attributed to defensive or offensive military operations as an enabling or 
potentially integrated capability to operational domain warfare, and if the demonstrated 
capability becomes linked to a specific force or nation state.  
Additional areas of research should examine the impact of technology growth and 
proliferation as fostered by the theft of large amounts of high-technology information via 
cyber exploitation.  This work could help explore the implications of the proliferation 
high-technology information and industry trade secrets to current U.S. exports in high-
technology and defense related areas.  
 
 iv 
It should be noted that the proliferation of the technical knowledge behind “the 
bomb” to the Soviets took years, and was undermined by several high-profile espionage 
cases (Gold, Greenglass, Fuchs, Rosenberg).  It may now be possible to transfer this same 
type of technical knowledge, albeit separated throughout several industrial areas and 
defense base contractors, remotely via cyberspace with little to no public attribution or 
knowledge of its loss.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
How is cyberspace changing modern defense?  This question has spurred many 
discussions, studies, and even the establishment of new military commands worldwide in 
the last decade.  In examining this question, this thesis aims to deconstruct the major 
issues surrounding cyberspace as a means to better understand how they are affecting 
modern defense.   
This topic is explored by examining three key questions, which correspond to 
chapters two, three, and four of this work in order. These questions are: 
(1) How does the evolution of cyberspace compare with aerospace as it relates to 
U.S. military demonstrations of domain power (i.e. cyber power versus air 
power)? 
 
(2) How does the U.S. Department of Defense compete with the private sector in 
the recruitment of the technical expertise needed to develop cyber warriors? 
 
(3) How does the Peoples Republic of China’s strategic Five-Year Plans drive 
their exploitation of cyberspace? 
 
Firstly, this work examines cyberspace as a domain of warfare akin to land, sea, 
air, and space exploring whether it is or is not the latest addition.  Exploring this concept 
proves exceptionally important to this study, as all current defense discourse asserts that 
cyberspace is in deed the fifth operational domain of warfare.  However, contrary to this 
assertion this work concludes that cyberspace is not yet an operational domain of warfare 
in the traditional sense, but domain-like, the details of which are explored in the 
following chapter. 
Secondly, as a means to better understand cyberspace as a United States 
Department of Defense warfare domain, chapter three explores the recruitment of U.S. 
cyber warriors.  What better way to understand the defense aspects of cyberspace than to 
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examine the expertise and background of those individuals being recruited to fight its 
wars and defend its assets?  Although, there was not a lot of information readily available 
within this topic area, the research was able to identify key impediments that may restrict 
or hinder the diverse recruitment of future warriors.  
Thirdly, to examine a possible adversary within cyberspace and how that 
adversary is leveraging cyberspace to wage war, chapter four explores The People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC) exploitation of cyberspace.  The findings in deed show that 
the PRC is exploiting cyberspace, but uncovers no direct linkages to or evidence of cyber 
weapons, but instead intellectual property theft in the guise of state sponsored corporate 
espionage.   Does this further support the findings that cyberspace is domain-like, and 
being used for the influence fight as an enabler? 
In concert, the various finding of this study help to add to the discourse of 
national defense on this topic exploring concepts of traditional kinetic warfare and 
deterrence in comparison to national enabling functions for defense and overall state 
advantage.  
Overall this thesis argues that for cyberspace to be a true operational domain of 
warfare, akin to land, sea, air, or space, in the traditional sense, that credible and 
attributed capability to an actor must be demonstrated in order for said capability to have 
a military coercive or deterrent effect that could be leveraged by policy makers.  Further, 
as it relates to defense and deterrence, it is paramount for offensive or defensive military 
manipulation of cyberspace as a weapon or tool of war and statecraft  to be surmised or 
known, and demonstrated or credible, in order for it to begin to earn a level 
understanding as a distinct military capability.  Simply leveraging cyberspace to obtain 
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information or steal secrets, an evolution of espionage tradecraft and not warfare, does 
not constitute a new operational domain of warfare, as has been argued and stated in 





CHAPTER 2:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTER-BELLUM AIR POWER AND CONTEMPORARY CYBER POWER 
 
“Cyber security threats represent one of the most serious national security, public safety, 
and economic challenges we face as a nation.” 
- 2010 National Security Strategy 
 
 
Global Internet usage has increased by more than 550% in the last decade, with 




  Since the Internet’s 
adolescence in the mid-1980s, it and cyberspace have often been viewed as little more 
than a conglomerate of disparate networks and servers, or an abstract technological 
domain. 
3
  Often, little thought is given to how cyberspace is changing human interaction.  
In today’s world, the Internet and cyberspace encompass the sole artificial reality 
in which mankind interacts.  In this reality, the digital language of ones and zeroes, yes 
and no, connects the creator to his creations often leveraging pre-existing 
                                                        
1
 The definition of cyberspace varies greatly with Webster’s Dictionary defining the word as “the 
realm of electronic communication,” and Collins Dictionary defining it as “all of the data stored 
in a large computer or network represented as a three-dimensional model through which a virtual-
reality user can move.” The U.S Department of Defense defines cyberspace as “a global domain 
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information 
technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” The definition of 
cyberspace pursued in this study includes parts of the above descriptions. For the purpose of this 
discussion cyberspace will be defined, as a three-dimensional virtual reality comprised of 
networked hardware and software used for human-to-human, human-to-machine, or machine-to-
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communications architecture such as telephone lines as an ever-growing network of fiber 
optic and wireless technology is created. This is communication at the speed of light. 
In spite of its’ synthetic origins and predominantly intangible nature, cyberspace 
has been labeled as a new operational domain for warfare within military and government 
discourse. 
4
  The label of domain has predominantly been saved for tangible reality in 
which man can physically maneuver or manifest.  Regardless of its uniqueness and 
virtual characteristics, cyberspace now fosters immense human interaction, while 
simultaneously embodying and reinforcing complex social networks, linking people from 
varied backgrounds and locations globally.  
Cyberspace is and will continue to be a fundamental part of globalized Twenty-
first Century life.  Understanding the implications of cyberspace in the context of national 
security, 
5
 international relations, and warfare will become increasingly important in the 
coming decades as the Global War on Terrorism and current U.S. forward presence and 
power projection becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.  Cyberspace offers 
opportunities for cost reductions if it can be operationally applied as a tool to foster a 
militarized virtual forward presence in support of U.S. interests.   
If the United States can successfully integrate and demonstrate the militarization 
of cyberspace into existing operational domains of warfare such as land, sea, air, and 
space, it may find a means to reduce military costs.  These cost reductions could be 
                                                        
4
 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2011., 5. 
 
5
 For this research focus will be given to the implications of cyberspace as it relates to the 
national security of the United States, leveraging examplars from other areas for comparison, 
although these findings will be able to be applied to most other nations whose militaries are based 
on the joint construct of the United States’ services (Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force etc.).  
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associated with a decrease in basing troops overseas and acquiring traditional kinetic 
weapons.  Forward basing of troops and traditional weaponry has historically been 
focused on limiting an adversary’s means to logistical support and sustain war.  
The operational use of cyberspace as a domain to support war offers a revolution 
in military affairs.  Instead of focusing on bombing industry and destroying lines of 
communication and logistics, tactics developed during the Napoleonic and World Wars, 
states can now make technology and communication inoperable by employing and 
exploiting weaknesses in the networks that connect weaponry, technology, and society. 
This study will investigate whether cyberspace is in fact a new operational 
domain for national security.  It is important to determine if cyberspace is an operational 
domain akin to the traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space, in order to assess the 
capability of the United States to integrate the emerging and evolving doctrine 
surrounding technology and cyberspace into traditional warfare.  This research will also 
attempt to identify parallels in the development of warfare policy as a means to 
potentially project future national security implications involving cyberspace.   
Specifically, the body of this work will focus on comparing and contrasting 
similarities between the developments of the domain doctrines of air and cyberspace as a 
means to support or refute the U.S. characterization of cyberspace as an operational 
domain. 
6
  In so doing it is hoped that this work will highlight that cyberspace does not 
need to be classified as an operational domain in order to support national security.  In 
                                                        
6
 Operational domain doctrine is the literature surrounding the use of a domain to achieve an 
objective often in support of national security. Within government and military writings once this 
doctrine has been proven and demonstrated it is often known as domain power i.e. air power, 




fact, the stove piping of various capabilities into distinct operational domains can serve 
more as a hindrance then an enabler in the creation of unified joint doctrine for war.  
Literature Review 
“Aeronautics opened up to men a new field of action, the field of the air. In so doing it of 
necessity created a new battlefield; for wherever two men meet, conflict is inevitable.” 
- Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, 1921 
 
The world has quickly integrated the power of the Internet and cyberspace, to 
include associated hardware, software, computing and networking, into daily life.  
Cyberspace and the Internet are ubiquitous to the majority of the public.  Cyberspace 
traditionally connotes technical architecture and systems engineering, while the Internet 
tends to be the laypersons entre into cyberspace.  Cyberspace and the Internet both 
promote the sharing of ideas, the proliferation of technology, and the growth of 
commerce worldwide. 
In the United States, cyberspace connects “energy, banking and finance, 
transportation, communication, and … Defense Industrial Base” sectors with the global 
economy. 
7
  The immediate connectivity cyberspace has brought to the world 
encompasses the breadth of global commerce and logistics.
8
  The high-speed 
communication and networks created by the Internet has spurred globalization, linking 
geographically separated and disparate physical realities (public and private tools, 
buildings, remote locations to public and private networks) to one another.  The 
                                                        
7
 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2011., 1-2. 
 
8
 Commerce in this context includes the human and compute- to-computer communication, 
logistics, and transactions involved in banking, production, trade, and defense. 
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connectedness brought by networking logistical hubs with command and control has been 
embraced by all sectors and has spurred new areas of communication and cooperation. 
This, coupled with cyberspace’s centrality to contemporary life has spurred national 
security sectors of world governments to explore cyberspace as a new operational domain 
to “organize, train, and equip” defense capabilities. 
9
   
The United States and other nations are organizing and creating government and 
military command structures focused on “synchronizing and coordinating” efforts in 
cyberspace. 
10
  With nations and militaries defining cyberspace as a fifth operational 
domain, there are opportunities to study the development of cyberspace in parallel to the 
established fronts of land, sea, air, and space as a means to project the potential evolution 
of the use of cyberspace in support of traditional warfare. 
11
  In order to examine the 
reality of cyberspace as an operational domain in the context of U.S. national security, it 
is key to understand the breadth and scope of the accepted definition of an operational 
domain. 
Within government and military literature operational domains are divided into 
areas focused on man’s capability to maneuver in physical reality.  Quite simply man can 
live on earth, transit the seas, fly through the air, and visit space.  Traditional operational 
domain doctrine has focused on exploring the application of power to fulfill or aid 
national security historically within the material domains of land and sea and within the 
last century air and space.  These domains have been further refined into the domains 
                                                        
9
 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2011, 5. 
 
10
 Ibid., 5. 
11




which constitute the global commons, sea, air, and space.  Global commons are the 
domains considered vital to international trade and commerce, of which national 
sovereignty only governs limited areas. 
12
 
The works of air power theorists, such as Italian, Giulio Douhet (1869-1930), and 
American, William Mitchell (1878-1936), provide great examples of doctrine developing 
organically based on man’s growing and evolving capability to maneuver within physical 
reality.  As new air capabilities developed (balloons, powered air craft, fighter aircraft, 
bombers etc.) doctrine evolved to address new capabilities or exploit newly discovered 
weaknesses.  This doctrinal development approach also works where doctrine out paces 
current technology, spurring technologic development to meet hypothetical doctrine.  As 
an example theorists propose strategic bombardment before the advent of bombers, and 
long-range bombers are created to answer the theory.  This example actually occurred 
with Douhet and his proposition of strategic bombardment in the 1920s which technology 
at the time did not support.  It was not until the 1940s that the long-range bombers of 
Douhet’s vision became reality.  
The development of doctrine, that is the literature that supports how to use a 
domain to wage war, helps to operationalize domains in support of national security 
objectives.  This can be seen in the development of air doctrine and its integral nature in 
the operational use of airspace in warfare.  By advocating for the strategic bombardment 
of nations by air, as a means to break civilian morale and thus diminish a nation’s 
capability to wage war, theorists such as Douhet, opened up the possibility of airspace to 
                                                        
12
 For more insights and thoughts on the politics surrounding global commons you can refer to 
Peter Dauvergne’s Handbook of Global Environmental Politics. Recent discourse has also begun 
to explore the Internet and cyberspace as a new global commons.  
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be used as a new to support national security. 
13
   In creating warfare doctrine for new 
technologic advancements (i.e. manned flight) theorists are able to repurpose what may 
have been viewed as science fiction into a real world operational context.  The use of 
aircraft during the World Wars was the anointment of the emerging domain of airspace as 
an operational domain, in support of national security thus creating new opportunities for 
to evolve and support traditional warfare. 
The creation of an operational domain has traditionally meant that capabilities of 
that domain have been proven.  Proven capabilities, based in the theory and doctrine of 
the domain are normally tested during war, and subsequently bring domain theory into 
fruition, shifting doctrine to a measurable form of power which can be demonstrated.  
Despite nations the world over declaring cyberspace as a fifth operational domain 
there remains dissenting views that cyberspace, in part due to its man-made nature and 
unproven operational doctrine, is not a new domain, but merely a new way of connecting 
and communicating between the traditional domains.  This is true; none of the other 
domains can strategically connect and affect all domains like cyber can.  Although 
artificial by nature, cyberspace is able to connect and affect all man-made capabilities 
that are networked, both by wire and wirelessly, within all other operational domains. 
This capability makes cyberspace and cyber power unique in comparison with the 
traditional domains of land, sea, air, and space. 
The U.S Department of Defense (DoD) explicitly defines air and maritime 
domains, focusing on their physical manifestations (i.e. the atmosphere, rivers and seas 
                                                        
13
 Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, Translated by Dino Ferrari, Washington, D.C.: Air 






  These definitions, which are found in the Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, predominantly focus on the physicality of the air and 
maritime domains.   
As outlined in On Cyberwarfare, a Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces publication, the man-made nature of cyberspace and the cyber domain, 
make it exceptional in comparison to traditional definitions. 
15
  Besides connecting all 
other domains, cyberspace also cannot exist without its man-made architecture and 
components making its reality non-physical.  If man were no longer to exist land, sea, air, 
and space would still be here.  Conversely, unlike the other domains, cyberspace can be 
replicated innumerable times by replicating the infrastructure that supports it; the 
physical reality of man is (the earth of the land, the seas of the world etc.) is bound by the 
physical limitations of matter (man cannot create matter, only reorganize it). 
16
   
There are plentiful examples of national power expression within the traditional 
domains.  These expressions of state power are often seen as the culmination of 
operationalizing a domain in support of national security; power being defined as the 
overt proven military demonstration of a capability in support of national interests or 
policy.  Power is often solely proven in times of war, as power often tends to focus on 
destruction, and periodically re-demonstrated during times of peace, under the guise of 
military training exercises.  This power re-demonstration additionally serves as a means 
                                                        
14
 Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, as amended through 15 October 2013.   
 
15
 Fred Schreier, On Cyberwarfare, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces 
Horizon 2015 Working Paper Series, no. 7 (2012), 12.  
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, reminding potential adversaries of the physical manifestations of 
capabilities whose effects may be so destructive that they are only showcased once or 
twice against human targets, as in the case of the atomic bomb.    
Although the world knows cyberspace exists, and there has been reporting on 
“cyber attacks,” as highlighted by the destruction of Iranian centrifuges at the Natanz 
nuclear facility, there has not been a proven attributable cyber power capability 
demonstrated. 
18
  The lack of attribution connected to a capability makes a demonstration 
of power impossible.  Without proven and attributable power capabilities within 
cyberspace, one could argue that cyberspace is not an operational domain analogous to 
the traditional war hardened domains of land, sea, air, and space.  
Although U.S. government policy is labeling cyberspace as the fifth operational 
domain of warfare, it may be more fitting to view cyberspace as an intangible addition to 
the global commons, supporting and facilitating communication within the traditional 
domains. 
19
  By translating physical reality into a global digital language, cyberspace 
connects the disparate and geographically separated technology of the world in ways 
telephone and its forbearer the telegraph could not.   
Although there is ample literature on the development of aerospace as an 
operational domain, which examines aspects such as reconnaissance, strategic bombing, 
                                                        
17
 In order for deterrence to truly work the capability must be demonstrated and most importantly 
attributable, meaning adversaries must know you have the capability as well as a demonstrated 
willingness to use it.  
18
 David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of 
American Power, New York: Random House, 2012. 
 
19
 Ibid., 13. 
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and nuclear deterrence post World War II, there remains little literature that is similar 
discussing cyberspace.   
Although current literature and doctrine states cyberspace is a new operational 
domain akin to air we see little in traditional demonstrations of cyber power as we have 
with air power.  This lack of state attribution and power demonstration, which 
undermines the argument that cyberspace is an operational domain, is not wholly 
negative to supporting the integration of cyberspace into the national security apparatus 
and consciousness.  There have been ample examples of cyber power being demonstrated 
since the 1980s, although these examples have predominately been attributed to hackers. 
20
 The term hacker has become pejorative in the public domain often carrying a 
connotation of simple computer nerds “playing” in cyberspace.   
Word choice in how we choose to describe cyberspace and the actors operating in 
it highlights the nuances that separate cyber crime from cyber conflict, attack, and war.  
These nuances have caused the current discourse surrounding cyberspace to become 
mired in the no man’s land separating policing actions and national security often 
blurring the threat cyber conflict poses to national security if it is not fully integrated into 
joint military operations and capabilities.  
This work will focus on identifying whether cyberspace is or is not an operational 
domain like aerospace.  For cyber power to become a tool for national security states 
must openly demonstrate its power and destructive capability.  
 
 
                                                        
20
  Healey., 18. 
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Methodology & Hypothesis 
“The very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who 
would disrupt and destroy.” 
- 2010 National Security Strategy 
 
After a thorough examination of the existing literature, exploring the arguments 
for and against cyberspace as an operational domain of warfare in pursing national 
security objectives, one major question stands out requiring further investigation. This 
question – How does cyberspace operationally compare against the defined warfare 
domains of land, sea, air, and space? – resulted in a study comparing and contrasting the 
development of air power with cyber power. 
The air domain, including subsequent doctrine and power examples, was chosen 
as a benchmark for investigating cyberspace as an operational domain, due to it being the 
most recently proved operational domain of warfare. The air domain was also chosen for 
comparison because it is the only domain to which man had no previous access and 
subsequent access only through technology.   
By conducting a comparative analysis of airspace with cyberspace, exploring the 
early development of air doctrine and its subsequent operational deployment in contrast 
to current cyber doctrine, I hope to use similarities and divergences to either support of 
refute the assertion that cyberspace is the fifth operational domain of warfare.  
In this analysis I hope to find parallels in the early development and employment 
of manned flight in comparison with the use of cyberspace. This development should 
progress along similar paths since both airspace and cyberspace access is dependent on 
technology that must first be developed and explored, with subsequent doctrine being 
written in order to operationalize a suggested capability in support of warfare.  
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If there are sufficient parallels in the development and employment of airspace 
and cyberspace as domains, I should be able to map growth of capability in support of 
national policy and ultimately power projection. If the development of airspace maps 
with cyberspace, it should be possible to predict the future path for the application of 
cyber power while simultaneously supporting or refuting cyber as fifth operational 
domain of warfare.  The development of capability may prove to be dependent or 
independent of creation of distinct domains, and should be recognized by the mapping of 
capabilities and counter capabilities to one another. 
Data & Results 
 
“History does not so much repeat as echo…” 
- Lois McMaster Bujold, A Fierce Domain 
 
The early evolution of cyberspace as compared to the domain of aerospace is very 
similar, particularly in examining the application of air power during the early 20
th
 
Century and interbellum periods.  The use of aircraft prior to World War I (WWI) was 
extremely limited and viewed mainly as hobby and past time; there was little thought of 
the aircraft’s military application when the Wright Brothers took flight in 1903. This is 
similar to the early development and application of the Internet by broad segments of the 
general public in the mid 1980s through 1990s (although the Internet’s genesis can be 
found in the U.S. defense sector).  The pilots of the early 20
th
 Century, pre WWI, and the 
Internet surfers of the mid-1990s had similar goals, focusing on personal past time in the 
pursuit of pleasure for their hobby. 
The progression of air power and cyber power has generally mirrored one another 
following a somewhat predictable course.  This course, highlighted in the below graphic, 
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begins with a new technology or capability being developed. This capability is first used 
for reconnaissance, which then leads to its use as an offensive or attack capability (in part 
to deny or degrade reconnaissance), resulting in the development of defensive measures 
to deny attack from adversaries, which ultimately leads to the institutionalization of the 
myriad of capabilities in support of national security interests.  The air power theory of 
WWI provides key context and details for this comparison.  
Table 1. Mapping of Air Power to Cyber Power 
 
Following the outset of WWI the aircraft began to be looked at for its applications 
to war.  Initially  
The great mobility and range of powered aircraft… led to their use in 
reconnaissance… Soon artillery spotter planes became a serious threat to troops 
on the ground. Since artillery specifically designed for use against aircraft had not 
been developed before the war, the only way to drive off interlopers intent on 
reconnoitering one’s positions was to attempt to shoot them down with weapons – 
at first handguns and rifles, later machine guns – mounted on one’s own aircraft. 





With successful demonstrations of air power during war, leaders and air theorists 
began to discuss and debate the role and future growth of air power. The main discourse 
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of the 1920s and 1930s built on the operational tactics developed during WWI. Theorists 
such as Italian, Giulio Douhet (1869-1930) and American, William Mitchell (1878-1936) 
debated the various aspects of air power. Douhet and Mitchell, who entered military 
service in their respective armies before the creation of flight, were the early lead 
proponents of air power and the aircraft’s application as an instrument of war in support 
of national policy.  
22
 
Douhet’s theory of air doctrine can be abbreviated as follows:  
(1) modern warfare allows for no distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants 
 
(2) successful offensives by surface forces are no longer possible 
 
 
(3) the advantages of speed and elevation in the three-dimensional arena of 
aerial warfare have made it impossible to take defensive measures against 
an offensive aerial strategy 
 
(4) therefore, a nation must be prepared at the outset to launch massive 
bombing attacks against the hard to shatter enemy civilian moral, leaving 
the enemy government no option but to sue for peace 
 
 
(5) to do this an independent air force armed with long-range bombardment 





The wrestling of balance between defensive and offensive military capabilities, as 
outlined in Douhet’s abbreviated theory of air doctrine, has striking similarities with the 
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current military dialogue of cyber doctrine development, and proposed operational 
application.  
Current cyber doctrinal discussions recognize that defense of logistical command 
and control and infrastructure is an integral part of cyber policy and doctrine. 
24
  A 
defensive posture supporting vulnerable targets is one concept that echoes Douhet’s fears 
that successful offensive capabilities of ground forces are no longer capable of outpacing 
a quick and highly mobile threat, as was the case with aircraft outpacing draft animal 
drawn and mechanized machinery during WWI.  A similar track can be seen in the 
development of U.S. cyber defense organization in the mid 1990’s and their militarization 
to focus on defensive as well as offensive operations in the early 2000s.  
25
 
Where Douhet proposed to counter diminishing defensive capabilities of 
traditional ground forces with heavy offensive strategic bombardment capability, the U.S. 
government is similarly adopting a declaratory deterrence policy as a means to support 
defense of the nation against cyber attack. 
26
  
The U.S. government is softening the strike first language of Douhet’s air 
doctrine, which advocated strategic bombardment aimed at breaking civilian morale, by 
advocating a two pronged approach to deterrence. 
27
  First, the United States proposes to 
deny an adversary’s use of cyber attack capabilities  against it by hardening defensive 
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capabilities and network resilience. The logic of this action assumes that if there are no 
vulnerabilities for exploitation then there is no cyber attack.  Secondly, if U.S. cyber 
assets should fail in denying an adversary the capability to attack, the United States will 
use the whole-of-government to respond to aggression militarily within cyberspace or 
within the traditional domains. 
28
 
This proposed U.S. approach to adversary cyber operations and attack, deterance 
by committing to all out warfare, may not seem analogous to Douhet’s advocated use of 
offensive strategic bombardment, but there are similiarities.  In fact, one could argue that 
current U.S. cyber policy, which supports a whole-of-government all out war deterrence 
model, is an updated version of offensive strategic bombardment and pre-emptive strike 
aimed at shattering civilian morale.  By balancing the non-kinetic warfare of cyber attack, 
meaning no bombs are used, with all out kinetic war leveraging traditional warfare 
capabilities of land, sea, and air, as is proposed by a whole-of-government approach to 
war, the United States maintains the focus of shattering civilian morale as a means to 
deter attack.  
Douhet’s air doctrine and current U.S. cyber policy both advocate shattering a 
nation’s will to wage war by focusing on degrading civilian support.  In Douhet’s time 
through World War II and into Vietnam, strategic bombardment of adversary industrial 
and logistical capability was an accepted use of air power.  
 In a modern era of precision munitions and public support decrying collateral 
damage, strategic bombardment of population centers has been modified, but still retains 
the goal of diminishing adversary popular support for war.  In the modern era popular 
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uprising often can overthrow a government. Proposing all out war, and pursuing actions 
against the United States which has demonstrated the capability to conduct sustained 
warfare, proves to be a powerful deterrent that can cause potential adversaries to take 
pause.  
Along with Douhet’s push for pre-emptive strategic bombardment as a means to 
deter warfare, American air power theorist William Mitchell argued for a dedicated 
service to ensure air power was a dominant warfare capability. 
29
  Mitchell’s advocacy 
for a highly skilled and trained air force during the 1920s and 1930s is similar to the push 
for a similarly technically sound cyber force. This also makes logical sense due to the 
very technical nature and specialized support structure needed to both maintain aircraft as 
well as computer systems and networks.   
Building off what seems technically sound, the U.S. military saw the creation of 
both an Air Force, in 1947, and Cyber Command, in 2009, to deal with the technical 
intricacies of conducting warfare in new areas as well as codifying the doctrinal dogma 
that guides these operations.  The mapping of air power and cyber power development, 
which focuses on meeting capability with defense is almost analogous; however this 
mapping does not necessarily support that cyberspace is indeed an operational domain.   
There remain key discrepancies between air power and cyber power that may 
support the conclusion that cyberspace is not an operational domain but an enabling 
function for pre-existing domains such as aerospace, land, and sea.   
Power projection has been key to the codifying of aerospace as an operational 
domain. This power projection is grounded in attribution and proven demonstration of 
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capability during war.  The anonymity of cyber power and lack of public and attributable 
U.S. demonstration of cyber capabilities greatly impacts the notion that cyberspace is an 
operational domain as compared to land, sea, air, and space. Unlike cyberspace, the U.S. 
has proven capability time and again in the physical domains. This leads to the 
conclusion that the virtual domain of cyberspace is not an operational domain analogous 
to land, sea, air, and space.  
Discussion & Implications 
 
 The growth of aerospace as an operational domain and the subsequent 
development of air power have followed a progression of capability which can be 
simplified in terms of offense and defense in the context of capability and deterrence.  To 
map out the development of air power, aircrafts were first used as reconnaissance in 
warfare. Adversaries met reconnaissance by developing anti-aircraft artillery (AAA).  
Anti-aircraft artillery led to the development of armed aircraft with attack capabilities, to 
protect and deter AAA.  Armed aircraft resulted in aircraft to aircraft aerial fighting.  All 
of these capabilities were developed during WWI.  The true strategic bombardment 
capabilities advocated by Duet did not come to fruition until World War II, almost a 
generation after air power was first used operationally, due to limits in technologic 
capability to support sustained flight and the carrying of large loads of munitions during 
WWI.  In this case doctrine and theory, which was eventually proven sound, outpaced 
capability.  
Douhet’s vision of a true aerial strategic deterrent was not fully realized until 
1945, when long-range aerial bombardment was married with the atomic bomb. This was 
fifteen years after Douhet’s death and twenty-four years after he first advocated strategic 
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bombardment in his treatise The Command of the Air.  In this case theory and doctrine 
outpaced technology.  The atomic age, and fully realized aerial strategic bombardment 
helped to usher in Mitchell’s dedicated Air Force (if only to maintain and ensure the first 
side of the nuclear triad).  In all, it took a generation for the air warfare theory and 
doctrine developed during the 1920s and 1930s to be fully realized into air power.  
In comparison we see have seen a limited, but similar progression of cyber 
doctrine and demonstration potential for cyber conflict and warfare although no proven 
and attributable use of cyber power.  The nuance between conflict and warfare is one of 
degrees of nuisance and destruction.  Cyber conflict has been defined as the use of 
cyberspace to attack, defend, and spy on one another “for political or other national 
security purposed” to the point of not causing destruction that would mirror the effects 
caused by traditional kinetic military attack. 
30
   The preponderance of publicly known 
cyber related incidences have been within the spectrum of conflict and not attack, and 
have been greatly focused on spying and acts of espionage to include the theft of 
intellectual property aimed at providing economic and technologic advantage.   A 
majority of the targets for this conflict have been military.   
The United States recognizes defensive aspects of cyber security “as one of the 
most serious economic and national security challenges,” while conceding further that the 
United States is not prepared to counter the current threat. 
31
  The U.S. military’s “global 
communications backbone… consists of 15,000 networks and seven million computing 
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devices across hundreds of installations in dozens of countries.” 
32
  This extensive 
information technology infrastructure, which does not include private industry that 
supports the military or broader government, facilitates U.S. military command and 
control but also logistical support, real-time provision of intelligence to forward forces in 
austere environments, and general communications. 
33
  The U.S. military, government, 
and economy are reliant on cyberspace, the Internet, and related IT for a preponderance 
of day-to-day functions.  Dependency without redundancy leads to risk.  The United 
States’ over reliance on cyberspace and the Internet is hazardous, as shown by a 
breakdown in control over Department of Defense networks in 2008.  
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) suffered “the most significant breach of 
U.S. military computers ever” in 2008. 
34
  This compromise, coined Operation Buckshot 
Yankee, was perpetrated by a foreign intelligence service through an infected laptop at 
U.S. Central Command, based in the Middle East.  The state perpetrator has not been 
made public.  
 Buckshot Yankee, which was initially introduced to a U.S. laptop from USB 
flash drive, quickly replicated itself on both classified and unclassified military 
government computers.
35
  This malicious software (malware) allowed data to be 
transferred without the U.S. government’s knowledge to the foreign intelligence service 
that created it. I t is currently unreported how many military secrets and how much 
information was compromised due to this cyber espionage; however, one can be certain 
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that this information, whatever it is, is now being used to gain advantage over the United 
States.  Cyber espionage, a small segment of the cyber spectrum of conflict, like 
Buckshot Yankee, erodes U.S. military effectiveness. 
In response to the Buckshot Yankee intrusion, the U.S. military implemented new 
defensive protocol and security rules for transferring data between networks.
36
  These 
procedures have helped to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with introducing outside 
hardware and software to secure networks; however, reactionary responses, such as these, 
do not eliminate the threat, especially since these protocols were only enacted on 
government networks, and not the vast networks of the civilian sector that supports the 
government.  
U.S. military and civilian networks are probed and scanned for software and 
hardware vulnerabilities millions of times per day, as former U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, William J. Lynn III, notes.
37
  With the ever-growing complexity, size, and 
dependency the United States places on its information technology, the Internet, and 
cyberspace, there are bound to be weaknesses that adversaries can exploit. In short, 
determined actors, if they find vulnerability, can “threaten the United States’ global 
logistics network, steal its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or hinder 
its ability to deliver weapons on target.”
38
  
The anonymity associated with perpetrating acts associated with cyber conflict is 
one of the key factors in making it difficult to label cyber space as an operational domain. 
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Although cyber power’s progression maps well with the progression of air power as 
highlighted by the tit for tat between offensive and defensive capability creation, the lack 
of attribution of capability is a hindrance to cyber space being labeled as an operational 
domain, and leads to the conclusion that cyberspace is a an enabling environment in 
virtual reality to support and reinforce national security in the traditional physical 
domains of land, sea, air, and space.  
The implications of this conclusion are not damning to the supporting effect 
cyberspace and cyber capability can provide to national security.  This conclusion implies 
that government and national security should consider cyberspace a tool and an enabler to 
support joint warfare that leverages the whole of government.  In the context of the 
Napoleonic concept of total war, which modern warfare finds significant roots, cyber 
conflict becomes a key enabler and global commons to exploit to achieve national 
security initiatives.  
The proponents for air power and the creation of a distinct service element to 
command it initially thought that aircraft could win a war and that armies and navies 
would become obsolete.  As air power theory has evolved this notion has changed.  The 
domain of aerospace and its associated air power are now seen as distinct capabilities to 
support joint operations, as seen in the concepts of air support to ground operations and 
airlift associated logistics.  
The idea of cyberspace as an operational domain may change in the coming years. 
At this time, there have been no attributed demonstrations of cyber power as a key-
deciding factor in conflict.  This may change.  One could think of scenarios that would 
meet a threshold of strategic surprise, a cyber Pearl Harbor if you will.  In this case, if 
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cyber power was to become a deciding factor in conflict, which means it would be proven 
in conflict and attributable to a state, it could be argued that cyberspace is an operational 
domain akin to land, sea, air, and space.  
Summary Evaluation of Hypothesis One 
 Contrary to U.S. doctrine and global military thought, cyberspace is not an 
operational domain akin to land, sea, air, and space.  The manmade nature of cyberspace 
compounded by the fact that cyber power has not been found proven, attributable, or 
decisive in conflict supports this conclusion.  
 The future of cyber power and cyberspace is still to be determined.  If cyber 
power becomes a deciding factor in future conflict, it may meet the threshold of 
becoming an operational domain; however, the fact that cyberspace effects manifest 
themselves in the physical realities of land, sea, air, and space remains a barrier to it 
becoming a distinct domain.   
 Cyber effects may one day prove to be pivotal as the world becomes increasingly 
interconnected through its networks.  This increase in global interconnectivity and 
dependency opens up areas of study looking into the implications of cyberspace as global 
commons.  As cyberspace and the Internet proliferate global life, should cyberspace 
become protected under international law?  Will cyberspace become so critical to future 
commerce and society that it is granted the same protections that international waters and 
space have to ensure that they remain accessible to all peoples?  
Bell’s telephone changed how humanity was able to communicate and interact, 
becoming adapted and integral to modern military command and control.  In spite of this, 
the telephone has never been thought of as a unique domain of warfare.  Cyberspace for 
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all its life changing impacts, and initial foundation of Bell’s telephone lines, remains 
similarly bound; at this time cyberspace is not a distinct operational domain of warfare, 




CHAPTER 3: AN EXAMINATION OF IMPEDIMENTS TO U.S. TECHNICAL 
RECRUITMENT OF CYBER WARRIORS 
 
 As discussed in chapter two cyberspace is an artificial reality resident and routed 
through an ever-growing global network of software and hardware, computers and 
information technology, that is increasingly connecting the developed and developing 
world.  The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has labeled cyberspace as the latest 
operational domain of warfare, akin to the traditional domains of war, land, sea, air, and 
space, a topic previously explored and refuted. 
39
   
Coinciding with this status elevation, the DoD has increasingly invested in its 
cadre of cyber professionals, since Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn III 
released the 2011 Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. 
40
  The 
July 2011 strategy outlined five strategic initiatives:  
(1) Treat cyberspace as an operational domain to organize, train, and equip so that 
DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s potential 
 
(2) Employ new defense operating concepts to protect DoD networks and systems 
 
(3) Partner with other U.S. government departments and agencies and the private 
sector to enable a whole-of-government cybersecurity strategy 
 
(4) Build robust relationships with U.S. allies and international partners to 
strengthen collective cybersecurity 
 
(5) Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce and 
rapid technological innovation. 
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 To help meet these initiatives the annual portion of the DoD budget dedicated to 





Although only one percent of the overall defense budget, the 2015 cyber budget is 
estimated to be $5.1 billion. 
43
  This three year budgetary increase has included an over 
8,000 person plus up in the cyber workforce of the U.S. Department of Defense. 
44
   
The DoD’s cyber workforce includes personnel working for the various services, 
Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines, as well as the National Security Agency (NSA) and 
joint combatant command U.S. Cyber Command (also known as CYBERCOM). 
45
  As 
the U.S. DoD has solidified their strategic vision for cyberspace they have levied an 
increasing demand single on recruitment, retention, and training of highly technical and 
specialized cyber experts.  The DoD has begun calling this cadre of military cyber 
professional cyber warriors.  This term is often used when describing the uniformed 
military members serving in the various branches of the U.S. Armed Services, but has 
also been used to describe the civilian defense personnel supporting the department’s 
cyber mission.  
So who are these cyber warriors? Where do they come from, and how does one 
become join the ranks?  These two questions, in the context of the Department of Defense 
                                                        
41
 Kevin McCaney, “DOD budget reflects impact of cyber, unmanned systems, R&D,” Defense 




 Brendan McGarry, “NSA Chief: What Cyberwarrior Shortage?” Defenstech, October 14, 2013, 







 Op. Cit., McCaney, “DOD budget reflects impact of cyber, unmanned systems, R&D.” 
45
 Op. Cit., McGarry, “NSA Chief: What Cyberwarrior Shortage?” 
 
 30 
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace fifth strategic initiative (leverage the nation for a 
cyber workforce), formed the basis of an examination of the U.S. Department of 
Defense’s most basic pipeline for recruitment, college and university graduates of 
Computer and Information Science programs.   
Literature Review 
 
 There is little currently written on what constitutes a cyber warrior in the realm of 
national defense or more specifically the U.S. Department of Defense.  In order to 
examine this area for evidence or information that is part of the current state of literature 
this study reviewed press releases, education statistics for the computer and information 
science degree paths, as well as recruitment and military demographics of the personnel 
pools from which cyber warriors or experts would be selected within the active duty 
component of the U.S. Department of Defense.   
 Israel recently announced that it was moving to allow its defense related cyber 
experts to network and share ideas with private sector Israeli industry as a means to spur 
innovation. 
46
 Additionally, Israel recognizes that its cyber military cadre are distinctly 
different from its traditional compulsory military force, noting that its best cyber 
capability comes from individuals who do not adhere to the traditional military lifestyle 
of discipline and taking orders. 
47
  The idea of military recruitment and the impact of 
voluntary and compulsory service on the inclusion of technical expertise with national 
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military’s may be a topic for further research, but is outside the scope of this analysis 
which focuses upon the U.S. DoD’s cyber warriors.  
 Israel and Great Britain are also leveraging untraditional areas for recruitments of 
their cyber work force.  Each nation is engaging with pre-collegiate groups through 
competitive hacking initiatives offering prizes of scholarships and jobs to the winners.  
This type of recruitment is embracing the non-traditional roots of hacking, and 
cyberspace exploitation that is learned through hands-on experience not education 
programs. 
48
  An area for additional research that could possibly add to this review would 
be an examination of the hacker culture of cyberspace and how one becomes a hacker.  A 
better understanding of hacker conventions which sponsor and discuss ethical hacking, 
may be a starting point for this research.  
 
Methodology & Hypothesis 
 
As previously discussed the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has both civilian 
and uniformed (traditional military) cyber warriors in its workforce.  As outlined in the 
literature review, education and training in computer and information science as well as 
computer security certifications are traditionally the driving factors, which qualify 
civilians to pursue a career working in cyberspace (be it programming, developing, or 
architecting computers and networks) supporting private and public sectors.    
The culmination of exploring the current literature dealing with cyber expertise 
resulted in asking the following question: How does the U.S. Department of Defense 
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compete with the private sector in the recruitment of the technical expertise needed to 
develop cyber warriors?   
In order to answer this question, the following analysis will attempt to tease out 
the different cyber career and education paths for U.S. Department of Defense civilians 
and active duty military personnel, comparing and contrasting how these two groups are 
trained to become cyber warriors.  It is hoped that in comparing and contrasting the paths, 
that the analysis will identify similarities and differences that may help to answer how 
well the DoD is competing with private industry in the recruitment and grooming of the 
highly technical skills associated with cyberspace.  Additionally, by answering how well 
the DoD is competing with private industry recruitment, this analysis may identify 
opportunities or areas that could benefit from additional analysis, support, or research.  
Data & Results 
 
 This study focused on analyzing the major sources of recruits for military civilian 
and active duty enlisted personnel who would fill roles as cyber warriors as a means to 
compare and contrast the sources to highlight disparities and possible areas for 
improvement.  Firstly, table two below, outlines the minimum age requirements for each 
U.S. military service.  As a general rule of thumb, it is very difficult to enter initial active 
duty military service beyond the age of thirty-five.  In 2012, 48.8 percent of the active 
duty enlisted military force was twenty-five years of age or younger, and 23 percent of 
the force was between the ages of twenty-six and thirty. 
49
  In total, almost 72 percent of 
the force was aged thirty years or younger. Additionally, only 5.9 percent of the total 
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active duty enlisted force has a bachelor’s degree or higher.  These statistics highlight 
that the majority of the resource pool that the military is pulling from in order to fill its 
ranks, including its cyber warriors, has little to know formal education beyond the 
requisite high school level.   
To help mitigate this lack of formal post-secondary education, the military has 
created and instituted training for its cyber warriors that is almost seven months long. 
50
  
This research was unable to locate or identify the curricula that constitutes this training 
for comparison to traditional public education within the computer and information 















As an aside, figure 1, below, depicts military recruitments nationally per one thousand 
youths, and highlights that traditional urban areas, to include Silicon Valley, are under 
represented in recruitment.  Although not coincidental and not conclusive, there may be 
valuable information gleaned from future analysis of military recruitments with specific 
area education standards including Internet and computer education courses.  This 
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analysis may highlight that the military’s recruitment is not targeting the proper 
demographic to meet the specific introductory technical skills required for a cyber work 
force resulting in the need for additional training efforts and education cost to the 




Figure 1. Military recruitment nationally per 1,000 youth 
 
 
 Unlike the DoD’s enlisted pool of potential cyber warriors, who have little 
specialized secondary training in computer or information science, and require abridged 
military training lasting approximately seven months with an unknown amount of on the 
job training, the civilian pool of candidates to draw cyber expertise from traditionally has 
post-secondary education.  
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 As a percentage of all U.S. bachelor degrees conferred, degrees in Computer and 
Information Science (the traditional discipline to equip cyber expertise) has routinely 
been under represented.  Since 1979 this degree field has accounted for no more than 4.5 
percent of all degrees conferred, and most recently has accounted for only 2.6 percent of 
the total 1,791,046 bachelor degrees earned in 2012, a mere 47,384 degrees (Figures 2 
and 3). 
52
   The number of private sector jobs supporting cyberspace (computer 
programmers and computer systems analysts) numbered 864,300 in 2012; these jobs are 
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Figure 2. U.S. Computer and Information Science degrees conferred from 1979 to 2012 as a percent 






Figure 3. Total U.S. Computer and Information Science degrees conferred at the bachelor’s level 
from 2000 to 2012 as a percent of all degrees 
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The U.S. colleges and universities have graduated less than 60,000 students in the 
Computer and Information Science fields annually since 2000 (Figure 4).  Of these 
graduates, women graduates count for on average less than a third of all bachelor’s 
degrees awarded, and equally if not worse percentage of master’s and doctorate degrees 
awarded (Figures 4, 5, and 6).  These graduations, which are a fraction of all U.S. 
graduations, highlight a significant lack of diversity in the fields that cyber warriors will 
be derived from, and may serve as an impediment to the Obama Administration’s and 
Department of Defense’s push for a diverse workforce as outlined in Executive Order 
13581 and the DoD’s Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan for 2012 - 2017.  EO 13581 
“directs executive departments and agencies to develop and implement a more 
comprehensive, integrated, and strategic focus on diversity and inclusion as a key 
component of their human resource strategies. While EO 13583 was focused on civilian 
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Figure 4. Total number of U.S. Computer and Information Science degrees conferred at the 







Figure 5. Total number of U.S. Computer and Information Science degrees conferred at the master’s 
level by gender from 2000 to 2012 
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Figure 6. Total number of U.S. Computer and Information Science degrees conferred at the 






Discussion & Implications 
 
 There are major implications with the recruitment of Department of Defense 
cyber warriors for active duty service as well as civilian positions.  As previously 
discussed, the main impediment for recruiting cyber expertise for the active duty military 
is the fact that so little of the enlisted work force has higher education or technical skills 
which would be learned in higher education.  This results on the onus of the education 
and training being carried by the DoD and military service components, in short then 
military has to complete 100 percent of the cyber training and education of its uniformed 
workforce; a major investment.  An additional impediment for the recruitment of cyber 
expertise within the uniformed military may be as simple as the traditional height, 
weight, and fitness standards the military adheres to.   The U.S. Army has recently begun 





investigating the relaxation of their physical fitness requirements for those technical 
fields, such as cyber warriors. 
61
  Relaxing these restrictions, along with those of age, 
may help the military attract individuals who have spent years in post secondary 
education, honing their understanding of cyberspace; a demographic that may have been 
traditionally overlooked as they push the uniformed active duty enlisted military age 
limits with advanced degrees and perhaps less than peak physical standards.  
 Perhaps one of the most glaring aspects of the recruitments of a diverse civilian 
workforce is the current disparity in the number of males and females who pursue 
degrees, both basic and advanced, within the Computer and Information Science fields, 
as highlighted previously.  Beyond the fact that few women pursue masters or doctoral 
degrees in this field, there are a limited number of these degrees conferred as a whole 
each year as a percentage of all degrees.  Will this limited enrollment, of which only less 
than 3 percent of all bachelors are now pursued annually in the last decade, create enough 
of an educated pool of candidates to meet both public and private sector demands?  With 
total number of private sector jobs forecasted to exceed one million by 2022, it may 
become increasingly difficult for the government and DoD to recruit and retain such a 
specialized workforce, unless compensation increases (an area which could use more 
research and study to determine the optimal compensation to compete with private 
sector).  
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 One aspect of this research that is lacking is a better understanding of the number 
of U.S. degrees granted to non-citizens.  As most Department of Defense and government 
positions require U.S. citizenship in order to obtain a security clearance, that actual pool 
of candidates eligible to work for the DoD and government out of the total that have 
degrees may be far less.  This data was not available from the National Centre of 
Educational Statistics at the time of this works completion, and identifies an area for 
future research.  





CHAPTER 4:  CHINESE MOTIVATIONS FOR CYBER-ENABLED 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT 
 
 
The United States is the world leader in technology innovation and intellectual 
property (IP) creation.  In calendar year 2013, the United States led the world in patent 
creation, accounting for 48.7 percent of all patents granted (147,652 of 302,948).
62
  U.S. 
intellectual property creation continuously spurs economic development, contributing to 
manufacturing which on average accounts for over $2 trillion of the U.S. national 
economy (about 12 percent of GDP).
63
   
Since its late 20
th
 Century commercial popularization and adoption by industry, 
the Internet has increasingly served as a major access point for global information and 
knowledge distribution.  In 1993 the Internet accounted for 1 percent of globally 
telecommunicated information; today, the Internet accounts for more than 97 percent of 
all telecommunicated information worldwide.
64
  U.S. “energy, banking and finance, 
transportation, communication, and … Defense Industrial Base” sectors are connected to 
the global economy via the Internet.
65
  The rapidity of Internet based communication and 
knowledge dissemination has no doubt contributed to economic globalization and the 
growth of U.S. industry.  Although U.S. industry has prospered from the connectedness 
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of the Internet, high technology business areas have become increasingly vulnerable to 
exploitation via Internet enabled intellectual property theft by state and non-state actors.  
At least half a dozen countries are currently exploiting U.S. corporate and military 
computer systems via the Internet and cyberspace to gain both economic and military 
advantage.
66
  The People’s Republic of China  (PRC) and more specifically the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) 3
rd
 Department of the General Staff, also known as Unit 61398, 
has come to light in recent press reporting as a prolific actor in the realm of Chinese 
cyber espionage and intellectual property theft.
67
  The PLA’s efforts to exploit U.S. high-
tech industry via cyber has been known to the U.S. government for many years; however, 
substantial knowledge of these efforts have just recently (2011 to current) become 
available to the general public.  
It is difficult to estimate the true cost of cyber exploitation, as there are no 
international, federal, or state mandates to report cyber incursions or theft.  Intellectual 
property theft via cyber exploitation can be swift, going unnoticed or even unreported.  
For example, “$1 billion – 10 years’ worth of research and development” was lost by one 
U.S. Company in a weekend after being attacked, and it is reported that the United States, 
across all industries, loses between $6 billion and $20 billion annually in intellectual 
property and investment opportunities.
68
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Cyber exploitation and intellectual property theft directly undermines the United 
States government, its business, and industrial base, while simultaneously posing a 
significant threat to the nation’s long term “military effectiveness and its competitiveness 
in the global economy.”
69
  
The PRC vehemently denies that it is exploiting U.S. interests in cyber space.
70
  
China’s denials of intellectual property theft via the Internet and cyber-enabled 
exploitation, in spite of contrary reporting, is intriguing and calls for further investigation.   
This study will aim to discover the motivation for the People’s Republic of 
China’s military targeting of U.S. intellectual property (IP) by cyber-enabled theft and 
espionage.  The following analysis will compare and contrast China’s strategic goals and 
objectives, as outlined in the nation’s Five-Year Plans, with China’s military doctrine and 
motivation.  It is hoped that any strategic correlations in objectives and doctrine will be 
able to be linked with real world examples of cyber theft and espionage as a means to 
verify these relationships. 
By identifying and verifying the PRC’s motivations for cyber-enabled IP theft and 
economic espionage, it may possible to determine the key industrial areas the PRC will 
target and exploit in the future.  By simply monitoring the open communication of the 
PRC’s Five-Year Plans the U.S. may be able to develop key recommendation to U.S. 
industry of sectors that will require additional cyber protection and hardening.  If this 
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analysis proves successful it will help to provide a mechanism of warning, which may 
allow a competitive advantage for protection of communication and cyber infrastructure 
against Chinese exploitation.     
Literature Review 
Since 1993, China’s military leadership has embraced the concept that cyberspace 
is a key warfare domain that must be controlled in order to maintain warfare effectiveness 




  China’s strategic military motivations for embracing 
cyberspace as a warfare domain is the most recent addition to a holistic national strategy 
aimed at increasing China’s economic development and independence.
73
  China’s 7
th
 
Five-Year plan, announced in 1986, announced the PRC’s strategic goal to increase its 
economic prosperity through economic development.
74
  As a means to further refine and 
center China’s whole of government economic development efforts, the People’s 
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 The numbering convention of 863 is derived from the establishment of the program in March 
of 1986, following the date convention for China that lists year followed by month. 
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 The 863 Program focused the People’s Republic on establishing a high-
technology industrial base as a means to spur its economic growth.  The scope of 863 has 
grown over the last quarter century, influencing successive five-year plans.  The 12
th
 
Five-Year plan, spanning 2011 to 2015, is the latest plan to continue China’s economic 
growth, concentrating on developing emerging industries that will strategically support 
the PRC in cultivating growth of technology exports.
77
  The PRC’s goal is to achieve a 
ten percent growth rate in exports of high-tech products ultimately reaching $2.5 trillion 
in exports by 2015.
78
 
In a June 2011 article from the Communist Party Youth Daily (Qingnian Bao), 
authors from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science 
espoused the importance of exploiting cyberspace, stating  “the quantity of military 
intelligence information obtained over the Internet is large, the classification level is high, 
the information is timely, and the cost is low, intelligence reconnaissance activities that 
are launched over the Internet are already omnipresent and are extremely difficult to 
defend against.”
79
  China’s military strategy is a reflection of the PRC’s over arching goal 
for maintaining and growing their economic supremacy.  China’s goal is partially met by 
rapidly acquiring superior high-tech industrial manufacturing capability through the theft 
of intellectual property and high-tech know how.  This approach uses the Internet as a 
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means to asymmetrically level the technological battlefield with strategic rivals and 
potential future adversaries.  
 China’s state-sponsored information, intelligence, and intellectual property 
collection from computer network exploitation (CNE), also known as cyber exploitation, 
espionage or intrusion, is not only targeting military technology but economic and 
industrial trade secrets spanning such diverse sectors as chemical engineering, 
automotive construction, and aerospace, as well.
80
  All these sectors factor into China’s 
12
th
 Five-Year Plan as areas where the state can increase its exports and achieve 
increasing financial gain.  
 CNE offers individuals conducting cyber espionage a means to remotely access 
computers and information technology (IT) around the world, rapidly stealing vast 
amounts of data with little to no risk of attribution.
81
  One of the largest examples of this 
type of exploitation in recent years has come to be known as Operation Shady RAT. 
Operation Shady RAT, a 2011 report compiled by Dmitri Alperovitch of McAfee, 
one of the world’s largest computer security firms, highlights the hacking of more than 
seventy-one corporations and government entities around the world by a single actor 
using RATs from 2006 to 2011.
82
  A RAT, an acronym for remote access tool, allows 
users to remotely access computers without detection giving individuals free access to 
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any information stored on the system.  This is but one of the many tools threat actors 
employ to compromise U.S. military and commercial networks. 
During his analysis, Alperovitch was able to discern that forty-two of the seventy-
one targeted corporations and government entities exploited were in the United States and 
represented defense contractors as well as state governments.
83
  Although McAfee 
declined to link Shady RAT to an individual actor, many cyber security experts believe 
China was the perpetrator due to the emphasis on targeting information pertaining to 
Taiwan, the Olympic organization before the commencement of the 2008 Beijing Games, 
and material covered by the U.S. Department of Defense Military Critical Technology 
List (MCTL).
84
  The MCTL is a list maintained by the U.S. government that highlights 
technologies unavailable for export.
85
  These technologies both provide the United States 
with military or economic advantage and cannot be exported to countries deemed hostile 
or competitive to U.S. interests.  
The transfer of wealth we are seeing in the form of stolen intellectual property is 
unprecedented as noted in Operation Shady RAT as well as a February 2013 report 
published by the company Mandiant.  The intellectual property that is being stolen 
through cyber exploitation represents billions of dollars of invested research and 
development.  If only a “fraction of [this knowledge] is used to build better competing 
products… the loss represents a massive economic threat not just to individual 
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Simply stated, China is investing and using cyber espionage and cyber network 
exploitation to obtain information and economic advantage.  By stealing technology 
unavailable for purchase, e.g. MCTL, or unrealistic to develop, i.e. too expensive, China 
is quickly closing its technology gaps.  
Defense experts have hypothesized that China’s recent advancements in fifth 
generation stealth aircraft may be directly linked to cyber exploitation of U.S. defense 
contractors.  As highlighted in Mandiant’s 2013 report APT1: Exposing One of China’s 
Cyber Espionage Units, we now know that the PLA’s cyber unit 61398 is most likely 
behind such exploitation on behalf of the PRC’s military and economic goals.   
There are circumstantial links between China’s exploitation and theft of key 
intellectual property from technology-based industries via cyberspace and the PRC’s 
economic development goals outlined in successive Five-Year Plan cycles.  To date there 
has not been a systematic mapping of economic technology development areas identified 
in the Chinese Five-Year Plans with documented cases of Chinese attributed cyber-
enable IP theft or economic espionage.  
This study will further analyze Chinese attributed IP theft and the targeted 
industries.  The current discourse of Chinese cyber espionage and intellectual property 
theft must move beyond the simple explanation that the PRC is pursuing economic 
development and requires the intellectual capital embodied in U.S. IP in order to do this.  
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There other motivations and factors at play.  Economic espionage is not new, but state-
sponsored economic espionage on an industrial scale, as we have seen within China, is.   
Hypothesis & Methodology 
 
 There is a significant base of evidence within the public arena discussing China’s 
exploitation of cyberspace as a means to obtain information, intellectual property, and 
overall decision advantage for economic and political gain.  The question is no longer if 
China is targeting U.S. industry, but why.  The following analysis shall aim to answer - 
How does China’s strategic Five-Year Plans drive their exploitation of cyberspace as a 
tool to equip Chinese industry with economic advantage at the detriment of U.S. industry 
and interests?  
 This study will attempt to answer this question by examining attributed PRC use 
of military enabled economic espionage as a means to obtain economic advantage.  The 
ultimate goal of this analysis is to demonstrate that China’s national goals and objectives, 
as outlined in its Five-Year Plans, are driving the technological areas that the Chinese 
military targets for cyber theft and espionage.  





Year Plans, as well as resulting programs of concentration (i.e. 863 Program etc.), as 
means to identify key industrial and technological areas that China hopes to leverage in 
order to increase their economic development and competitiveness.  It is hoped that by 
examining the Five-Year Plans, a theme of particular economic interests and 
technological areas will emerge that can subsequently serve as distinct sectors to look for 
attributed Chinese cyber theft and espionage.  Merely correlating the Five-Year Plan 
industrial focus areas to attributed Chinese origin cyber exploitation does not prove that 
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the Chinese government is systematically targeting high-tech sectors for military cyber 
exploitation.  In order to strengthen the hypothesis that the high-tech economic 
development areas, identified in the Five-Year Plans, are driving Chinese military 
attributed cyber targeting I will investigate the United States’ prosecution of Chinese 
spies.   
By correlating the technology sectors targeted by both traditional and cyber-
attributed Chinese espionage with the economic development sectors outlined in China’s 
Five-Year Plans, I hope to strengthen the argument that China’s strategic economic 
interest is driving a whole of government approach to technology acquisition, and that the 
PLA’s cyber exploitation is meant to support economic development.  Although not a 
smoking gun, I hope that by identifying and correlating documented instances of 
traditional espionage with cyber espionage that a temporal relationship will emerge.   
 If these correlations are sound there should be a temporal decline in documented 
traditional espionage and theft as cyber-enabled events increase.  The logic is that China 
should reduce traditional espionage efforts, mitigating the risk of a publicized “spy” trial, 
in support of the anonymity of cyber exploitation and the ability to conduct these 
operations from within national boundaries, decreasing the risk of discovery, capture, and 
prosecution.  
Additionally, in context of the Asian Miracle, it may be that China’s economic 
interests will focus on increasing high-tech production and exports as a means to develop 
national wealth, thus leading to an increased consumer base and overall increased 
Chinese standard of living.   If this analysis supports Chinese targeting of industrial 
sectors with a focus on production and export of high-tech or defense related material, 
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assessments of Chinese military, political, and territorial claims may need to be 
increasingly viewed from an economic perspective.   
China’s military modernization and technology growth may be indeed indicative 
of a  “peaceful rise,” if we are seeing China shift its export model from low profit mass 
consumer goods production (i.e. clothes, throw away trinkets etc.) to high profit high-tech 
industrial and defense related material.    
Data & Results 
 
 Since the onset of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms the People’s Republic of China has 
strategically focused on economic growth and expansion.  In successive Five-Year Plans, 
China has focused on establishing the economic foundation necessary to shift its 
economy from a model based on “excess labor” and manual production to one centered 
on technological innovation and research and development. 
87
   
 China’s 7
th
 Five-Year Plan, 1986 to 1990, and its subsequent 863 Program, 
China’s national high-tech research and development (R&D) program, spurred the 
People’s Republic to pursue domestic economic growth by developing key high-
technology industrial areas focused on increasing China’s influence in the world arena.  
88
   




 Five-Year Plans, 
863 focused China’s R&D efforts on key areas.  These areas included developing: 
 
1. Technologies for the construction of China’s information infrastructure. 
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 Ministry of Science and Technology of the People’s Republic of China, “National High-tech 





2. Biological, agricultural and pharmaceutical technologies to improve the 
welfare of the Chinese people. 
 
3. New materials and advanced manufacturing technologies to boost industrial 
competitiveness. 
 
4. Technologies for environmental protection, resources and energy development 




Even today, China continues to rely on “foreign technology, acquisition of key 
dual-use components, and focused indigenous research and development… to 
advance…” both military and civilian modernization. 
90
   
China’s national drive has spurred traditional industrial and economic espionage 
as a means to pursue technological innovation in order to meet national modernization 
objectives dictated by the Five-Year Plans.  Be it the use of spies or individuals with 
sympathies (racial or monetary) to the People’s Republic, China is focused on leveling 
the technologic playing field with the West.  




 Five-Year Plans, there have been 
twenty-nine U.S. indictments for economic and industrial espionage against Chinese 
nationals, or individuals supporting China’s interest (See Figure 7). 
91
  




 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security  
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2014, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
2014, pp 13.  
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 The key technologies targeted in these indictments include those industrial areas 
identified in China’s 863 Program (new materials, advanced manufacturing, etc.). 
93
   As 
highlighted in Verizon’s 2014 Data Breach Investigation Report, cases of cyber-
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 In 2013, the United States was the target of more than half (54%) of all cyber-
espionage (See Figure 9), followed by South Korea (6%) and Japan (4%). 
96
  It is rather 
interesting that the top three nations targeted by cyber-espionage in 2013 are regional 
peer competitors of the People’s Republic. 
 














 Mandiant’s 2013 APT1 report, which attributes known instances of cyber-
espionage to Chinese military unit 61398, shows that the preponderance of known 
Chinese cyber-intrusions have targeted the United States (See Figure 10). 
98
  Verizon’s 
analysis of regional actors exploiting cyberspace for espionage also highlights Eastern 
Asia as the point of origin for nearly half of all cyber-espionage in 2013 (See Figure 11).  
99
  Although not a smoking gun, the fact that in 2013 nearly half of all cyber-espionage 
originated in Eastern Asia, targeted the United States, and along with China’s APT1 
focused on the United States as a target, points to China as the likely perpetrator.   
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 Mandiant. APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. 
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Furthermore, China’s seven priority industries identified in its 12
th
 Five-Year Plan 
correlate to the industrial areas targeted by China’s cyber-espionage unit 61398 (Figures 
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Figure 12. China's 12
th
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Figure 13. Mandiant's 2013 reporting of Chinese targeted cyber-espionage industrial areas 
105
 
 China’s strategic objectives as outlined in successive Five-Year Plans, 1986 
through 2005, have targeted key U.S. research and development industrial areas, these 
industrial areas are also the same areas that have been targeted by China’s cyber-
espionage unit 61398.   
Discussion & Implications 
Photographs of the Chinese Shenyang Aircraft Corporation’s (SAC) J-31 bare a 
striking similarity to the U.S.’ F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. 
106
  If China has compromised 
the F-35 program via cyber-espionage, the United States has lost over $300 billion of 
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research and development, not including losses in foreign sales, as well as considerable 
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U.S. national leadership recognizes cyber security “as one of the most serious 
economic and national security challenges,” while conceding further that the United 
States is not prepared to counter the current threat. 
110
  The U.S. military’s “global 
communications backbone… consists of 15,000 networks and seven million computing 
devices across hundreds of installations in dozens of countries.” 
111
  This extensive 
information technology infrastructure, which does not include private industry that 
supports the military or broader government, facilitates U.S. military command and 
control but also logistical support, real-time provision of intelligence to forward forces in 
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austere environments, and general communications. 
112
  The U.S. military, government, 
and economy are reliant on cyberspace, the Internet, and related IT for a preponderance 
of day-to-day functions.  
 The PRC’s focus on building high-tech industries and industrial manufacturing 
capacity, as outlined in successive Five-Year Plans as well as their National R&D 
Program (863), has led to a whole of government approach to technology acquisition in 
support of economic development. In answering the question - How can we prove that 
China’s strategic Five-Year Plans drive the use of covert military assets (i.e. the People’s 
Liberation Army) as tools to equip Chinese industry with economic advantage at the 
detriment of U.S. industry and interests? – one needs simply to compare what China’s 
says its interests, goals, and objectives are with what the nation is investing in and 
pursuing.   
 China’s strategic communication through their Five-Year Plan cycle goals 
coupled with proven espionage cases (indicted U.S. prosecutions), and attributed military 
supported cyber-espionage shows a powerful link between Chinese strategic doctrine and 
the leveraging of state tools and capabilities in order to meet national objectives. China’s 
strategic aspiration is to increase its world economic standing and the standard of living 
for its people.  China’s high-technology output, a major factor in bolstering China’s 
economic standing, has been steadily increasing for more than a decade (beyond that of 
peer competitors, see Figure 16). 
113
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In spite of this, China remains a nation that relies on the acquisition of foreign technology 
and dual-use technology as a means to support and augment its lack of indigenous 
research and development.  
115
   
 In order to meet ambitious goals set fourth in its strategic communication China 
must obtain development advantage by acquiring intellectual property relating to high-
technology sectors through any means possible.  China will continue to leverage a whole 
of government approach to acquire high-tech IP that will leverage the military and cyber-
espionage as a means to obtain high volumes of data and IP quickly.  Unlike the West, it 
makes sense for China to leverage the military in support of national economic interests.  
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Where the state owns the preponderance of the enterprise why would it not use all tools 
to ensure success?   
China’s communication of its strategic goals and objectives via its Five-Year 
Plans offers U.S. industry an opportunity to prepare and protect its critical industries and 
intellectual property against theft and exploitation via cyber-espionage.  China has 
demonstrated that both its traditional as well as its cyber-espionage interests are aligned 
to meeting the high-tech industrial capabilities and goals communicated by their Five-
Year Plans.   
Summary Evaluation of Hypothesis Three 
 One could argue that the evidence is circumstantial; however, the People’s 
Republic of China has demonstrated that in order to meet the goals and objectives set 
forward in their strategic Five-Year Plans, the PRC will leverage all aspects of their 
government in order to achieve success, including military supported cyber exploitation 
and intellectual property theft.  U.S. industry can leverage the industrial development and 
concentration areas outlined in China’s Five-Year Plans as focus areas China will be 
target for cyber exploitation and theft in order to close high-tech shortfalls and spur PRC 
information advantage.   
This thesis has established a relationship between traditional Chinese espionage 
and attributed cyber exploitation and theft over time.  This relationship was established 
by linking, mapping, and correlating U.S. indicted and tried Chinese espionage cases 
targeting high-technology information and industry areas identified in Chinese Five Year 
Plans with Chinese attributed cyber exploitation and theft against the same high-
technology and industry areas.  As U.S. indictments against Chinese nationals rose over 
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time so did Chinese attributed cyber exploitation.  Chinese cyber exploitation and 
intellectual property theft began to replace traditional human enabled information 
gathering following peak Chinese indictments in 2008, with Chinese attributed cyber 
theft reaching its peak in 2013, a year that saw no indictments for Chinese espionage 
against key industrial areas.  China’s shift from traditional human-enabled espionage and 
information gathering to cyber-enabled virtual collection shows a logical movement 
towards gathering information that is difficult to indict, leveraging technology and 
resulting in collection of information that is low risk and high gain.  There is opportunity 
for U.S. industry to protect itself from this cyber exploitation and intellectual property 
theft by hardening and protecting the key information and industrial growth areas China 
indentifies in its Five Year Plans.   
 Increasingly the use of China’s military to conduct this intellectual property theft 
via cyberspace has muddied the waters.  Although not covered in the examination and 
breadth of the work, I would argue that China’s ultimate goal might not to be to target 
U.S. industry in order to obtain military defensive or offensive advantage, but to close 
technological gaps in order to obtain economic supremacy.  China seems to be striving to 
evolve beyond being the world’s factory to become the innovative, high technology, 
research and development market of the globe.   This area could benefit from further 
analysis. 
If China can achieve becoming the research and development hub of the world, it 
may be able to leverage high-technology manufacturing as a means to surpass the United 
States in intellectual capital creation, moving beyond the need for a military deterrent 
against U.S. intervention.  If China can further secure its economic supremacy by 
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building alliances and dependencies based on defense export relationships, it will bolster 
its regional independence through market shares and trade.   The PRC’s targeting of U.S. 
high-technology areas is perhaps the beginning of efforts to undermine U.S. global 
exports and defense trade relations, as a means to obtain international favor within the 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
How is cyberspace changing modern defense?  Is cyberspace an operational 
domain of warfare or simple domain-like?  This thesis explored these questions by 
deconstructing the major issues surrounding cyberspace into three focus areas.   
The three topics explored, which corresponded to chapters two, three, and four of 
this work in order, were: 
(4) How does the evolution of cyberspace compare with aerospace as it relates to 
U.S. military demonstrations of domain power (i.e. cyber power versus air 
power)? 
 
(5) How does the U.S. Department of Defense compete with the private sector in 
the recruitment of the technical expertise needed to develop cyber warriors? 
 
(6) How does the Peoples Republic of China’s strategic Five-Year Plans drive 
their exploitation of cyberspace? 
 
Firstly, this work examined cyberspace as a domain of warfare akin to land, sea, 
air, and space exploring whether it is or is not the latest addition.  Exploring this concept 
proved exceptionally important to this study, as all current defense discourse asserts that 
cyberspace is in deed the fifth operational domain of warfare.  However, contrary to this 
assertion this work concluded that cyberspace is not yet an operational domain of warfare 
in the traditional sense, but domain-like.  The major implication of this finding is that the 
domain cyberspace and its associated cyber power is currently being leveraged as an 
enabler of warfare, and as a tool for the influence fight (i.e. mainly reconnaissance, 
information gathering, and preparation of the traditional battlefields of land, sea, air, and 
space). 
Secondly, as a means to better understand cyberspace as a United States 
Department of Defense warfare domain, chapter three explored the recruitment of U.S. 
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cyber warriors.  What better way to understand the defense aspects of cyberspace than to 
examine the expertise and background of those individuals being recruited to fight its 
wars?  Although, there was not a lot of information readily available within this topic 
area, the research was able to identify key impediments that may restrict or hinder the 
diverse recruitment of future warriors including a potential shortage of technically 
qualified personnel for the DoD to leverage due to low graduation rates and anticipated 
16 percent private sector growth rates through 2022 culminating in over a million private 
sector jobs, which are almost ensured to pay more than government or DoD service.  
Thirdly, in the examination of a current example of how a nation state is 
leveraging cyberspace, and a potential future adversary for which warfare could be an 
option, chapter four of this work explored The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) 
exploitation of cyberspace.  The findings in this chapter indeed show that the PRC is 
exploiting cyberspace, but uncovered no direct linkages to or evidence of China’s use of 
cyber weapons, but instead intellectual property theft in the guise of state sponsored 
corporate espionage.   
In concert, the various finding of this study have helped to assert that within the 
discourse of national defense cyberspace is currently optimized for the influence fight 
and not traditional kinetic warfare as historically seen in the domains of land, sea, air, and 
space.   Further research is needed to reexamine this assertion if cyberspace, through a 
myriad of non-kinetic exploits or capabilities, can be leveraged to create a defensive or 
offensive capability that is attributable, known and seen by the world, to a specific force 
(non-state actor) or nation state in the future.   
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Overall this thesis has argued that for cyberspace to be a true operational domain 
of warfare, akin to land, sea, air, or space, and not simply domain-like, that credible and 
attributed capability to an actor must be demonstrated in order for said capability to have 
a military coercive or deterrent effect that could be leveraged by policy makers.  Further, 
as it relates to defense and deterrence, it is paramount for offensive or defensive military 
manipulation of cyberspace as a weapon of war to be surmised or known, and 
demonstrated or credible, in order for it to begin to earn a level understanding as a 
distinct military capability.  As previously stated, simply leveraging cyberspace to obtain 
information or steal secrets, an evolution of espionage tradecraft and not warfare, does 
not constitute a new operational domain of warfare, as has been argued and stated in 
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